Community of fear by Brown, Harrison Scott
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-1960 
Community of fear 
Harrison Scott Brown 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 






























































































This is one of a series of pamphlets concerning issues that are 
fundamental to the maintenance of a free society. These pam- 
phlets and related materials are published by the Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, California. 
The Center is now the main activity of the Fund for the 
Republic, I nc. 
The studies of the Center are directed at clarifying basic 
questions of freedom and justice, especially those constitutional 
questions raised by the emergence of twentieh century institu- 
tions. The task of clarification is being undertaken by a group 
of distinguished Americans acting as Consultants to the Center. 
One of the areas of study is war in relation to democratic insti- 
tutions. This paper by Harrison Brown and James Real was writ- 
ten in connection with this study. Dr. Brown, one of the Center's 
Consultants and professor of geochemistry at the California 
Institute of Technology, is a noted scientist and the author of 
"The Challenge of Man's Future" and "The Next Hundred Years," 
among other books. Mr. Real, who has been collaborating with 
Dr. Brown in this area for some time, is a management and sales 
consultant and an adviser to the Center's Study of the Political 
Process. 
The Center for the Study of Democratic lnstitutions is a non- 
profit educational enterprise established by the Fund for the 
Republic to promote the principles of individual liberty expressed 
in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Con- 
tributors to publications issued under the auspices of the Center 
are responsible for their statements of fact and expressions of 
opinions. The Center is responsible only for determining that the 
material should be presented to the public as a contribution to 
the discussion of the Free Society. 
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A N O T E  OF E X P L A N A T I O N  
Among the studies of the Center for the Study of Demo- 
cratic Institutions has been a continuing examination of 
United States foreign and military policy. As background 
for further discussions, we were asked to prepare a paper 
on the arms race as it relates to the technology of modem 
war. We were asked two questions: What is the nature of 
the arms race? What are the consequences of its perpetua- 
tion likely to be? 
We have attempted to project the present trends of the 
arms race into the future. The projection which emerges 
is admittedly a depressing one, yet it is not without its hope- 
ful aspects. The problems which confront us, and which 
are outlined, are certainly unprecedented in history. But, 
like most problems, they are soluble once they are under- 
stood. 
In this paper we present many problems, but no solutions. 
We hope that the presentation contributes in some measure 
to their eventual solution by helping to create a broader base 
of understanding of the critical situation in which the world 




This little but important study, revealing and explaining the 
terrifying dimensions of destruction that thermonuclear weapons 
have reached, as one ironic development of the rapid advances of 
our technical civilization, should be read and studied by every 
thoughtful American. It will dispel many illusions. * 
Most Americans are aware that one aspect of the rather incon- 
venient "cold waryy between the two power blocs, which divide the 
world between them, is the possibility of a nuclear war. They are 
vaguely uneasy about this possibility; but they are not inclined to 
inquire further into the dreadful abyss at the edge of which two 
giants are wrestling each other. They are diffident about further 
inquiries, partly for the same psychological reasons that we are 
loath to look into a great depth lest dizziness overtake us. But 
Americans are also loath to make further inquiries because they 
have been assured that we are building bigger and bigger bombs 
in order to deter aggression; and that we are anxious to come to 
an agreement with the Russians, if they will only be reasonable 
about an inspection system. 
These complacent assurances, intended to quiet the residual 
anxiety of thoughtful people, leaves at least two factors out of 
account. The one is that, while neither side would probably start 
a nuclear war, the present attitudes or policies of both sides, 
expressed in the phrase "arms to parley," are strikingly similar, so 
much so that without some new impetus from the public tbc 
stalemate is likely to continue. But the second fad is even more 
important. It is that while we have this immediate peace through 
a "balance of terror'' the most terrifying arms race of history is, 
in fact, proceeding at an ever more accelerated pace. This study 
is intended to reveal both the dimension of destruction of the 
bomb, which is one portion of the competition in military tech- 
nology, and of the delivery system, that is the missiles, which 
constitutes the other dimension. 
There is a dim awareness in the general public of the magnitudes 
involved in both portions of this competition in weapons tech- 
nology. But this study, for the &st time I think, gives vivid images 
of the terrifying possibilities of destruction in the thermonuclear 
weapons, and of the annihilation of space and time which is the 
consequence of technical advances in the delivery system. This 
latter development makes war by miscalculation or misadventure 
more and more a probability rather than a possibility. There is, 
as it were, a time bomb under our vaunted security. Ultimately, 
the ever-accelerated pace of the arms race must lead to disaster, 
even if neither side consciously desires the ultimate war. That is 
why the old slogans of "bargaining from strength" and "arms to 
parley" and "deterring attack by the prospect of massive retalia- 
tion" have become irrelevant. A fresh approach is needed, 
prompted by an awareness of the common danger, rather than by 
the complacent assumption of either side that they are strong 
enough to prevent an attack or to win the war if it should come. 
The authors have wisely limited themselves to the task of 
describing the common danger, and the irrelevance of the old 
methods of staving it off by overcoming this or that deficiency in 
the technology of modern weapons. They have purposely not 
spelled out the details of a fresh approach. I will not presume to 
suggest even the barest outline of a fresh approach, when they 
have wisely refrained from doing so. I will merely observe that 
such an approach must obvio~isly begin at the only place where 
a sense of community has been established, across the chasm of 
a great ideological and power conflict. That minimal community 
has been established through the sense of an involvement in a 
common predicament and peril. The reality of this minimal com- 
munity is, incidentarlly, underlined by the growing differen 
I m t w h  the Russians, who are aware of the collimon peril, 
the Chinese, w b  are not. 
What is implied in this study is not the proposition that 
Russians can, or c8mot7 be trusted; or that the defense of val 
of our Western civiiiz%tion against Communist power is, or 
not, a simple task. The implication is confined to the simple am-:: 
viction that we are involved in a race which neither we nor thy, 
Russians a n  win. We all have our own ideas of how to escape ' 
the nuclear dilemma. Many of these ideas are Utopian and irr+\ 
vant. As one who rejects the strategy of fleeing from dif~l&,,-: 
problems by taking refuge in impossible soIutions, I am the rn- 
enthusiastic about this study which codnes itself to a clear 
ation Or: the magnitude d the pmb1em and, by implicatiori, to 
miticism of presendy*propmd solutions which obscure the dim 
sion d the problem. 
Introduction 
It is Mcul t  for most of us to comprehend the enamity of the 
revolution in military technology through which we ate now pass- 
ing. During the greater part of World War 11, strategic bombing 
planes carried blockbusters of TNT which weighed a little over 
twenty tons. By the end of the war two atomic bombs had been 
dropped upon Japan by two bombers. The power of each of these 
weapons was 1,000 times greater than that of their chemical 
predecessors. In less than a decade following the end of World 
War I1 thermonuclear weapons were developed which multi- 
plied the power of atomic weapons by another factor of 1,000. 
Today a modem strategic bomber can carry an H-bomb which 
has the destructive force of 20 million tons of TNT. 
Let us represent the explosive power of a World War I1 block- 
buster by a one-foot ruler. On this scale the bomb that demol- 
ished Hiroshima would be represented by the height of the 
Empire State building, and a twenty-megaton weapon by the 
height of the orbit of Sputnik I. One thermonuclear bomb releases 
more destructive energy than that released by all of the bombs 
dropped on Germany and ,Japan during World War 11. With the 
development of the thermonuclear weapon man, has begun to 
deal with the release of quantities of energy comparable in mag- 
nitude to the energies involved in many of the large-scale forces 
of nature observed upon the earth such as hurricanes and earth- 
quakes. 
Concurrent with the revolution in the destructive power of 
explosives, there has been a revolution in the speed of delivery. 
The maximum speed of the major heavy bombers of World War 
I1 was a little over 300 miles per hour. Modem jet long-range 
bombers can travel at 650 miles per hour. But with the develop- 
ment of the ballistic missile it is now possible to transport thermo- 
nuclear explosives at speeds greater than 10,000 miles per hour. 
In fifteen years, the transit time for a bomb flown between Mos- 
' cow and Washington has been reduced from sixteen hours to less 
than thirty minutes. 
After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the belief was 
widespread that war had become obsolete. The atomic bomb, it 
was believed, had made war so horrible that nations would not 
dare to go to war again. However, little in the history of war sup- 
ported this view. Man's ability to rationalize the perpetration of 
horrors upon his fellows appears to be ahnost limitless. The "open - 
city" concept, feeble but still alive at the end of 1918, had gen- 
erally been abandoned under the pressures of the relentless Blitz- 
kriegs of the early 1940's. There were a few exceptions such as the 
sparing of the holy city of Rome by both the Germans and the 
Allies, but these were largely political decisions, little affected by 
humanitarianism, ethics, or ideals. Art treasures and cultural arti- 
facts were pooled with millions of human beings in the furnaces of 
attrition. 
The wave of revulsion that swept the world after the indiscrimi- 
nate destruction of Rotterdam and the searing of Coventry was 
followed by application in kind of what had been learned by the 
victims about massive aerial destruction. For example, after the 
most complex planning and preparation, the British wgte able to 
destroy Hamburg in 1943. Over a ten-day period the German city 
and 70,000 of its men, women, and children were consumed in a 
cauldron of fire and high explosives-up to that time the most 
catastrophic man-caused event in history. Later, mammoth efforts 
to obliterate Dresden, London, and other cities were only some- 
what less successful, but not for lack of diligence on the part of 
the attackers. The subsequent fire-raids on Tokyo and, finally, the 
atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were accommodated 
as military necessity with relative ease-supported by the logic 
which had earlier been developed in Europe. Yet, following the 
atomic bombings of the Japanese cities, countless persons, inchid- 
ing many who were knowledgeable and competent, were con- a 
vinced that a major war fought with nuclear weapons could well 
bring the end of civilization. 
But the war had not been over long before military leaders had 
more or less adjusted themselves to the concept of atomic war. 
Far from being unthinkable, such a war, it was believed, could be 
fought and won. Soon the Bikini tests were held by the U. S. Navy. 
The Air Force came to believe that it had an ultimate weapon in 
its hands, which it could use to impose a Pax Americana. Work 
was started on developing ''small" atomic weapons to be used by 
the Army for tactical purposes. 
With the advent of thermonuclear weapons the belief that 
war is unthinkable once again came to be widely held. Cer- 
tainly, it was believed, war is really now too homble to be 
fought again. An all-out nuclear war, it was said, could mean 
not only the death of our civilization-it could mean the death of 
mankind itself. 
This belief was soon attacked.' It was argued that although all- 
out thermonuclear war is unthinkable, there can still be small or 
"limited" wars. We must do everyhng within our power to pre- 
vent a large-scale nuclear war, but military force as an instrument 
of national policy is by no means obsolete. It was argued that we 
must prepare ourselves for limited wars and develop, for this pur- 
pose, a variety of tactical atomic weapons. At the same time, the 
concept of massive retaliation was brought forward as a deterrent 
to all-out thermonuclear war. No nation, it was asserted, would 
dare launch a large-scale attack were its leaders convinced that in 
the process their own cities would be destroyed. 
Still more recently we are asked to consider that even all-out 
thermonuclear war is by no means unthinkable-provided it is 
not too all-out. ~ r o ~ o n e i t s  of this view2 believe that measures can 
be taken which would save the lives of many individuals in the 
event of a large-scale attack. It is argued that although such a war 
See, for example, H. A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 
New York : Harper and Brothers ( 1957 ) . 
Notably Herman Kahn in Thermonuclear War, Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press ( 1960). 
is h o d e  to contemplate, there could be a d c i m t l y  large n- 
ber of survivors, and a sdciently large quantity of undamaged 
consumer itnd capital goods and raw materials, to permit the 
nation to rebuild its economy in a reasonable period of time-say 
ten years. 
If the view that it is possible for a nation to survive a large-scale 
nuclear war is correct and (even more important) were large 
number of persons to b e h e  this view to be correct, the threat 
of all-out war would continue to be an important factor govan- 
ing the relationships between nations. The extent to which tbe 
possibility of war would continue to dominate international rela- 
tions would depend in part upon the extent to which people 
believe that survival is possible and in part upon the risks which 
a nation as a whole is willing to take in order to attain a political 
objective. 
The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the future assuming 
that the people of both East and West are willing to take substan- 
tial risks, that tbey believe that a nation can survive a large-sde 
attack, and tbat'they continue to prepare themselves accordingly* 
Let us assume that they mergetidy prepare themselves to 
fight limited wars using tactical nuclear weapons. What might tbe 
future have in store under these circumstances? 
The Arms Race 
For fifteen years we have been in the largest and most frantic arms - 
race that the world has ever known. During this period the Soviet 
Union and the United States have recognized that war between 
them is a possibility. Under the circumstances each nation has. 
attempted to put itself in the position of winning the war should , 
it come. Actions have brought reactions, which in turn have ,: 
brought new actions. Military expenditures in both nations have . 
increased to staggering size. With the mobilization of scienw 
a 
and technology, capabilities for destruction have increased ex- 
plosively. 
When World War I1 came to an end, the United States alone 
possessed the atomic bomb. This new weapon had come into ex- 
istence as quickly as it did because of the fear that Germany, with 
many competent scientists and engineers available, might "get 
there first." 
The atomic bomb created an imbalance in military capability 
which the Soviet Union was quick to appreciate. It is likely that 
the discussions of the Baruch proposals failed in 1948 in large 
measure because the Soviet leaders foresaw that were they to 
enter into such an agreement, the imbalance in nuclear military 
technology might be perpetuated. 
The Russians pursued the new technology, and by 1951 they 
had tested three nuclear weapons. We in turn pursued the possi- 
bility of thermonuclear devices and carried out our first test of 
such a device in 1954. By 1956 our own thermonuclear bomb had 
passed into the third generation, and the Russians were manu- 
facturing their own variety. 
During this period nuclear devices were not only made larger- 
they were made smaller as well. A variety of flexible, efficient fis- 
sion bombs were developed for tactical use, and the United States 
announced that it intended to utilize such weapons should a war 
start. The Soviet Union followed suit. 
By 1956 a revolution was taking place in the means of delivery. 
In the United States the B-47 had come and gone, and the B-52 
was in production. The Russians had substantial numbers of long- 
and medium-range bombers - Badgers, Bears, and Bisons. But 
even more important, a variety of missiles had entered the picture. 
Soviet successes in the missile field led to the establishment of 
intensive programs in the United States on the Atlas, Titan, and 
Thor. 
The development of a Soviet strategic bombing force led the 
United States to build the DEW line, establish a radar systek in 
Turkey, add a new series of fighters to the Air Defense Command, 
and develop a series of missiles for air-defense purposes. The first 
nuclear warhead for air-to-air rockets was tested in 1956. In 1958 
the NATO sphere. 
The development of Soviet ICBM's led to the use of the U-2 ; 
in order to ferret out Soviet bases, to the establishment of alert 
and dispersed SAC operations, and to the development of the 
Polaris missile designed to be carried by the nuclear-powered 
submarines. 
Improved missile capabilities led to the development of earth 
satellites, first launched successfully by the Russians, then by the 
U.S. Realization of the vulnerability of our SAC and missile bases 
to a "first strike" is now leading to the development of Atlas bases *- 
capable of withstanding explosion pressures of twenty-five pounds 
,I: 
per square inch and of Titan bases capable of withstanding 100 
pounds per square inch. A ballistics missile early warning system 
is now being put into operation. 
Today the arms race continues. Military expenditures in the 
United States corresponding to about 10 per cent of our gross 
national product are met by expenditures in the Soviet Union 
corresponding to perhaps 25 per cent of her gross national prod- $ 
uct. Production of nuclear explosives continues at full speed, 
and it is estimated that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. together 
possess explosive material corresponding to about 30 billion 
tons of TNT, or about ten tons of TNT for every inhabitant of 
the world. 
As the technological competition continues, it seems clear that 
sometime in the mid-60's ballistic missiles will form the bulwark >q 
of the striking forces of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Bases will become increasingly hard. Guidance will be- 
come more accurate. A variety of military satellites will emerge. 
Bombs, missiles, and satellites will become less expensive. But 
- 
above all we can expect in the years ahead many more "break- 
throughs" which will lead to a number of startling and unexpected 
military developments. Even less expensive and more efficient 
methods for the destruction of large segments of life and the 
products of human intelligence are almost certainly within our 
grasp. 
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 
Thermonuclear weapons range in explosive force up to somewhat 
more than twenty megatons, corresponding to 20 million tons of 
TNT. These heavy bombs can be carried by B-52 bombers. The 
sizes of bombs that can be carried by missiles are at present 
smaller. Minuteman and Polaris will probably be able to carry 
one-megaton warheads by the mid-60's. Soviet ICBM warheads 
and Atlas and Titan will probably be able to carry warheads 
ranging from five to ten megatons. 
When a ten-megaton warhead is detonated, roughly a third of 
its total energy is released in the form of heat and light. The bomb 
material and surrounding air are heated to extremely high tem- 
peratures, and the resultant fireball grows quickly to a diameter 
of about three and a half miles. The heat flash persists for about 
twenty seconds and on a clear day can produce third-degree 
bums out to about twenty miles and second-degree burns out to 
a distance of twenty-five miles from the explosion. A ten-megaton 
burst in the atmosphere thirty miles above the earth could set fire 
to combustibles over 5,000 square miles on a clear day. 
A surface burst of a ten-megaton bomb would produce a crater 
about 250 feet deep and a half mile wide. The zone of complete 
demolition would be about three miles in diameter. Severe blast 
damage would extend to about nine miles from the center of the 
explosion, and moderate to major damage would extend out to 
twelve miles, or over an area of 450 square miles. 
It is likely that firestorms will result from a thermonuclear 
burst over a large city. A firestorm is a huge fire in which cooler air 
is drawn to the center of the burning area, elevating the tempera- 
ture and perpetuating the conflagration. Winds reach hurricane 
velocities. The holocaust consumes the available oxygen in the 
air with the result that persons not burned to death may die of 
suffocation or of carbon monoxide poisoning. 
The explosion results in the instantaneous emission of nuclear 
radiation in quantities that can be lethal at distances up to two 
milesS but since persons in &at area would be kind anywa 
and t h m d  efiects, this is not an important factor. 
more dangerous i s  the radiation from radioactive products 
are produced in the explosion and which are scattered over 
countryside as "fallout.* 
More than 200 different radioactive species are formed 
explosion of a thermonuclear weapon. These attach them 
to the inert debris which is swept into the air by the explosion 
which form the f& mushroom cloud. The heavier 
of debris fall back to earth within the first hour or so. The 
prtic1es are carried downward an4 depending upon the 
conditions, will be deposited over an area fifteen to thnty 
wide and 100 to 500 miles long. A thermonuclear bo 
ploded at low altitude deposits about 80 per cent of its 
locally in this manner. The balance is injected into the stratos 
and is distributed globally. About one-half of the fission d 
carried into the stratosphere of the Northern Hemisphere f 
earth within a year. 
The local fallout from a ten-megaton explosion could, if 
uniformly, produce lethal levels of radioactivity over ab 
square d e s  of Iand. Thus, in the absence of some protection 
radiation, there could be many deaths far from the center 
explosion. Indeed, in the event of a large-scale thermonu 
attack and in the absence of radiation protection, far more 
would d t  from radiation effects than from heat or blast. 
Ten Megatons on Los Angeles 
In an attempt to comprehend the order of magnitude of the 
of a thermonuclear explosion over a major rn 
us imagine that a ten-megaton warhead is 
area of downtown Los Angeles. The bomb hits during the w 
ing hours of a weekday and the attack occurs sometime in the 
-this last in deference to the strategic supposition that a nuclear 
war will be launched only after the crops are harvested and put 
underground by the attacker. 
The blast effects would exterminate virtually all but the most 
deeply sheltered living things within a iadius of five miles. Blast 
casualties would be severe up to a distance of ten miles. But the 
phenomenon that would complete the devastation of life in the 
entire area would be fire. The area would be one great sea of 
he,  which would burn until there was nothing more to consume. 
A good proportion of the metropolitan area's three-and-a-half 
million cars and trucks would be lifted and thrown like grotesque 
Molotov cocktails, to spew flaming gasoline, oil, and automotive 
shrapnel onto and into everything in their paths. In an instant 
most underground gasoline and oil tanks would rupture and ex- 
plode within the blast area, and a large proporbon of the re- 
mainder within the firestorm radius would follow, each in its own 
particular manner-pumps and pipes sheered and, finally, higher 
and higher ambient temperatures which would soon expand, rup- 
ture, and explode the remainder. 
~ e ~ o n d ' t h e  blast radius, the remaining area of Los Angeles is 
occupied by relatively few first-class concrete and steel buildings; 
a much greater proportion is the debris of an industrial society: 
auto junk yards, lumberyards, row upon row of cheap flammable 
commercial structures. But most important, this remaining area 
is comprised of over 50 per cent brush-covered hills and scrub 
forest. Anyone who has participated in the fighting of a ~akorn ia  
brush fire and who is acquainted with the remarkable explosive 
nature of the oil-carrying greasewood, sumac, and scrub pine is 
surprised and frightened by the volatility of the material even 
when it is wet. The novel aspect of a thermonuclear codagra- 
tion, however, is that most of these highly flammable materials 
would break into intense flame simultaneously-a phenomenon 
never before achieved either by man or by natural causes. 
There are relatively few facts about large fires. Several firestorms 
were produced. by the incendiary bombing of German cities, and 
one such storm occurred after a fire raid on Tokyo. An atomic 
bomb created a firestorm at Hiroshima, but not at Nagasaki. It 
seems safe to speculate that in Los Angeles at least a twenty-five- 
mile radius and an unknown distance beyond it would be, within 
minutes, engulfed in a suffocating firestorm that would persist for 
a long time. It seems unlikely that there would be appreciable 
rainfall for weeks or even months; thus, the basin fire would pro- 
ceed in all directions with no interference from man or nature. 
1.t seems clear that in the event of such an attack there would be 
virtually no survivors of the blast and thermal effects, with the 
possible exception of a few persons who had made elaborate prep- 
arations for surviving the catastrophe. Their shelters would have 
to be very deep and provided with a built-in oxygen supply and 
cooling system. Unless they were abk to maintain themselves in 
such a shelter for many weeks, their chances of making their way 
to relative safety would be slim. 
A major problem would be trying to get through ankle-high to 
knee-high ash containing numerous hidden pitfalls; clambering for 
dozens of miles over huge, smoking piles of radioactive rubble, 
burned-out timber, wire, and steel. If the survivor made it to the 
edge of the devastated area, he in all probability would have accu- 
mulated by that time a fatal dose of radiation which would shortly 
claim what was left of his life. 
Although the Los Angeles situation is an extreme one, the vul- 
nerability of other major metropolitan areas differs only in degree. 
If firestorms are indeed the rule rather than the exception, as 
seems likely in view of the huge quantities of flammable materid 
that exist in all cities, we can expect the survivors of a direct hit 
by a thermonuclear bomb to be few in number. Civil defense prep- 
arations in our major metropolitan areas would appear, under the 
circumstances, to make sense only if we were willing to rebuild 
those areas to provide for deep, extensive, and sealed underground 
quarters. An alternative would be to provide for rapid mass evac- 
uation to the countryside, where shelters need only protect 
against the fallout. But the time for such evacuation following 
warning of an impending attack by missiles would be so short that 
the technological problems involved in moving the people would 
appear to be considerably greater than those involved in providing 
deep underground shelters. 
In any event, it is evident that individual metropolitan areas 
are extremely vulnerable to thermonuclear attack. It is also clear 
that any program designed to decrease the .vulnerability of these 
areas would be difiicuIt to put into effect and extremely expensive. 
Rationally, were we to make vigorous efforts to survive a large- 
scale nuclear war, we would forget about our existing cities, recon- 
cile ourselves to the loss of their inhabitants, and concentrate our 
efforts in other areas. 
Twenty Thousand Megatons 
on the United States 
It is not possible to predict with any accuracy what the physical 
and biological effects of an all-out nuclear war upon the United 
States would be. At one extreme it could result in the total annihi- 
lation of our people and our cities. At the other extreme our cities 
might be spared, and deaths might be relatively few. All grada- 
tions in between are possible. The actual effects would depend 
upon a multiplicity of factors including the time at which the war 
starts, the nature of the weapons systems then in effect, and the 
nature of defenses. 
Were the United States to become involved in a thermonuclear 
war today, the primary targets would probably be the Air Force 
bases from which we might retaliate, together with certain other 
military installations. Assuming that the Soviet missiles wete 
guided with reasonable accuracy, these bases could be destroyed 
quickly with a relatively small number of bombs. Under the cir- 
cumstances, threats of massive retaliation could be carried out 
only by those of our planes and missiles that were in the air at 
,the time of attack-conceivably a very small number. With our 
bases destroyed we would be helpless. The Soviet Union could 
threaten to destroy our cities unless we capitulated. Thus, the war 
would be over without the loss of any of our major cities. The lives 
lost would be those involved with our military installations here 
and abroad and in adjacent cities and towns where fallout could 
claim many victims. 
In the continental United States about 130 Air Force and other 
military installations might be,the targets of such an attack, and 
perhaps 500 to 1OOO megatons would be dropped. Optimistically, 
as few as 10 million deaths would result were the attack to take 
place today. More likely, there would be about 20 million deaths, 
largely because of the proximity of many important Air Force and 
other military installations to population centers. 
Thus, any thermonuclear attack upon the United States @at 
would make sense from a military point of view would involve a 
minimum of something over 100 delivered bombs totaling about 
500 or more megatons in energy. There are good reasons to sup- 
pose that an actual attack would be considerably larger than this. .- 
It is M c u l t  to imagine the emergence of a situation other than 
accident that would result in a smaller attack. A major decrease in , 
the number of key military installations in the continental United ;, 
States could bring about such a situation, but in spite of' the devel- ,; 
opment of the Polaris submarine there is little evidence that this 
will happen. Let us focus our attention, then, upon attacks larger 
than 5OO megatons. I 
In 1959 the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint 
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy attempted to pro- 
. <.. 
vide a picture of the effect upon the United States of a 1500- . 
megaton attack-about three times larger than the "minimum" at- 
tack described above. The Committee took testimony from a num- 
ber of experts concerning the effects of a simultaneous attack 
upon 224 centers, about half of them military. The data presented 
indicated that were the attack to take place today nearly 25 mil- 
lion deaths could be expected the &st day and an additional 25 
million persons would be fatally injured. An additional 20 million 
persons would be injured, but not fatally. Nearly 75 per cent of 
the deaths would have resulted from the immediate effects of the 
explosions and 25 per cent would have resulted from fallout. More 
than half of the surviving injured would have d e r e d  radiation 
in juries. 
It should be emphasized, however, that these estimates of cas- 
ualties are minimal, for they include only the estimates of casual- 
ties resulting from blast, direct t h e d  effects, and radiation. The 
estimates do not include casualties resulting from such secondary 
effects as the disorganization of society, a disruption of communi- 
cations, massive fires, extiaction of livestock, spread of disease, 
genetic damage, or the ingestion of radioactive materials. 
In the attack visualized, about 12 million dwellings would have 
sdered blast damage to the extent that they would not be sal- 
vageable. An additional 9 million dwellings would have suffered 
some blast damage. Almost half the dwellings in the United States 
would have been either severely damaged or contaminated by fall- 
out to the extent that they would not be usable for at least several 
months after the attack. Estimates were not given for secondary 
fire damage to structures. This could exceed by a considerable 
margin the damage resulting from blast. 
Thus we could expect that a 1500-megaton attack, were it to 
take place today, would result in the death or injury of at least 
one-third of our population. It has been pointed out that with the 
provision of appropriate shelter protection the number of casual- 
ties could be greatly reduced. At the same time we must recog- 
nize that attacks considerably larger than 1500 megatons are tech- 
nically feasible. Indeed, in our present state of unpreparedness for 
a thermonuclear war, it is now possible in principle for an enemy 
virtually to annihilate our population. One may argue legitimately 
whether the annihilation of our population would serve any useful 
purpose to any enemy. -But the fact that it is possible in principle 
for another power to achieve such a result warrants a discussion 
of the possibility. 
Were it not for the fact that a substantial fraction of our coun- 
try is, at all times, covered with clouds, an enemy could completely 
scorch our earth by exploding about 600 ten-megaton bombs, 
evenly spaced, at an altitude of about thmty miles. On a clear day 
forests, grasslands, and crops would ignite or wither, as would 
the flammable structure of the cities, towns, and villages. All 
exposed living creatures, except those living in the water, would 
perish. A substantial fraction of the human beings who were pro- 
t h d  blacaust. Others would perish as the r d t  of such . 
ondary dkts of 'the catastrophe as lack of food and adequate 
medical care. 
Foa~natdy at any one time clouds protect about 50 per am& 
of the nation, but such a technique could readily be applied to the: 
clear areas. The cloud situatian at any given time could be detarP; 
mined by observation from satellites of the Tiros type. M&&B 
guidance mula be relatively crudeerrors of ten miles d d  bq 
easily tolerated. * 
An attempt to annihilate the population with fallout w& 
require more explosive per unit grea than would the t h d ;  
approach, but in the absence of protective shelters the quantitt~ 
involved would by no means be prohibitive. In our present u n F  
pared state a 20,Ooemegaton attack using bombs with a twa- -: 
thirds fission yield designed to maximize deaths would rest& 
in the death from fallout within sixty days after the attack BE 'I 
virtually everyane who had survived the initial afects of blast a d  
heat. 
It seems likely that in our present state we 
as a nation, unable to recover, by an att~ck considerably 
20,000 megatons: We do not know the maximum damage that 
oouM be tolerated by tbe United States and that would permit . , 
the m C v m  to rebuild the' economy. However, one can conceim 
of an attack, considering all major direct and indirect effects, , 
which would result & virtual adhilation of our 
villages, forests, and farmlands. Such an attack would consist-of e 
suitablemixture of bombs exploded at high altitude to make 
imum use of thermal effects (2,000 to 3,000 mt ) , of d a c e  
designed to destroy military bases and the major urban 
( 1,500 to 3,000 mt ), and bombs exploded 
of fallout in areas which are not damaged by 
first two categories ( 1,500 to 4,000 mt ) . 
It seems likely that we have rack?& or will soon reach, the 
point where an attack of this size muld be mounted against. 
from'the point of view of the nuclear explosives required. It 
improbable that systems for the efficient del 
'20 
ties of explosives will be available in the very near future, but 
the revolution in delivery systems may well bring the Soviet 
Union to that point in a few years. 
Deterrence and Stability 
The United States is at present apparently committed to a 
policy of not striking the first blow in an all-out nuclear war. Even 
were this not our strong moral position, in the situation toward 
which we are heading it would be a strong practical position. It 
is doubtful that we will know accurately the geographic locations 
of most Soviet ICBM sites. Were the United States, in a first strike, 
to destroy only a fraction of the Soviet missile bases, those remain- 
ing could be launched to create a devastating retaliatory attack. 
It is widely recognized that the Soviet Union could have an 
enormous advantage in launching a first strike against the United 
States. Committed as she is to a policy of not striking first, the 
United States has attempted to build up a deterrent force, or 
second-strike capability, which is aimed primarily at the large 
cities and industrial complexes of the Soviet Union. In theory, so 
long as the Soviet leaders believe that the major Russian cities 
would be utterly destroyed in the event of a strike against the 
United States, they would not dare launch the attack. 
In the days when both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relied upon 
delivery by airplanes, when warning times were relatively long, 
threats of massive retaliation from our SAC bases could be believ- 
able to the Russians and, depending upon the amount of damage 
the Soviet leaders were willing to sustain, could be effective. But 
the rapid upsurge in Soviet missile capabilities is creating a situa- 
tion in which the threat of massive reprisal by the U.S. is rapidly 
losing credence. 
The mainstay of our retaliatory force has consisted of strategic 
bombers located at SAC bases in various parts of the world. With 
the arrival of the missile age, in which warning times are short, 
those bases are quickly becoming extremely vulnerable to attack. 
The United States is being forced to consider extreme stop-gap 
measures, such as the airborne alert, to protect its manned bomber 
capability. It is also engaging in crash programs designed to nar- 
row the deterrent gap. Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic 
missiles are being built to be fired from hardened bases within our 
borders. The Polaris system, in which missiles are fired from long- 
range nuclear-powered submarines, is being urgently developed. 
It would appear that the United States is entering a period of 
several years during which our strategic force will not in itself be 
an effective deterrent to a first strike by the soviet Union. During 
this period, if war does not break out, factors other than relative 
deterrence capabilities will have played a major role in its preven- 
tion. These factors may range from the strong desires of the lead- 
ers of both East and West for peace to a conviction on the part of 
Soviet leaders that the U.S.S.R. ,can attain its political and eco- 
nomic objectives without recourse to violence. 
If we pass through the current critical period without war, then 
the fulfillment of our current major goals, coupled with Soviet 
reactions to our actions, will probably give rise to a situation in 
which both the Soviet Union and the United States possess power- 
ful and invulnerable retaliatory missile forces. Some of these will 
be of the Polaris type. Others will be mobile and land-based. Still 
others will be underground in fixed locations. 
A number of knowledgeable persons are looking forward to the 
establishment of such sy~terns.~ When neither nation can destroy 
the other's retaliatory force in a first strike, it is believed that there 
will be no first strike. Such a system is often looked upon as being a 
"stable" one-as distinct from the situation in which we are now 
involved. 
In view of the fact that the combination of technology and 
international politics is leading us rapidly to the development of 
relatively invulnerable retaliatory systems, it is important that we 
examine factors which affect their stability. Can they really be 
stable? If they can, then in effect technology will have eliminated 
3 See, for example, Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defme,  
New York: Random House ( 1959). 
large-scale war from the world scene. Or is such a system basically 
unstable? If it is, and if we follow this path to its end, it is likely 
that we will perish. 
The Spread of 
Nuclear Military Technology 
In thinking of deterent systems, we usually think in terms of the 
two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet 
nuclear technology-and in particular nuclear military technology 
-is spreading. England conducted nuclear tests several years ago. 
More recently, France tested her first nuclear device. It is probable 
that nuclear military technology will spread to a number of addi- 
tional nations in the course of the next twenty years. 
A recent study4 indicates that eleva additional countries are 
technically and economically able to embark on successful nuclear 
weapons programs: Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Most of these nations are highly industrialized and 
either have operating reactors or arrangements for obtaining 
them. 
Eight countries are cited as being capable economically, al- 
though more limited in technical competence and in scientific 
manpower than the countries in the first group. These include 
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Poland, and Yugoslavia. 
An additional six countries are viewed as probably being eco- 
nomically capable, although being appreciably more limited in 
industrial resources and scientific manpower: Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Norway, Spain, and the Union of South Africa. It is diffi- 
I 
4 W. Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser, The N-th County Prob- 
lem and Anns Control, Washington: National Planning Association (1960). 
cult to see now any of these countries could achieve a successful 
nuclear weapons program within the next five years. 
But when we view the situation from the point of view of the 
requisite capabilities, in principle there could readily be Ween 
nations producing nuclear arms within a decade. Within twenty 
years nearly thirty nations could be in the nuclear bomb business. 
Quite apart from their achieving independent nuclear military 
capabilities, nuclear arms will almost surely spread to other nations 
as the result of military alliances. Although the United States 
exerts nominal controls over all of its nuclear weapons, it has in 
effect placed them in the hands of its NATO allies. It is possible 
that the Soviet Union will eventually place weapons in the hands 
of certain of its allies such as China and North Korea and conceiv- 
able that she might later place such weapons in the hands of cer- 
tain nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South- 
west Asia. 
It is not at all unlikely that nuclear explosive devices, and the 
ingredients for making them, will eventually enter into interna- 
tional commerce. This will be particularly true if such devices 
are used on any appreciable scale for peaceful pursuits such as 
earth-moving. 
Nuclear weapons are rapidly becoming less complicated, less 
expensive, &d easier to manufacture. They are by all odds the least 
expensive means of killing and destroying. They can give smaller 
nations power for waging war which is out of all proportion to 
their true industrial power. Given such weapons, Cuba in princi- 
ple could threaten the United States, or Turkey could threaten 
the Soviet Union-to be sure, not enough to annihilate, but enough 
to cause really serious trouble. For these reasons the pressures 
leading to the spread of nuclear weapons and of nuclear military 
technology appear to be too strong to be overcome in the absence 
of a forceful agreement between the present nuclear powers. 
There is no substantial evidence that this will occur. 
A nuclear weapon, to be effective, must be delivered to a target. 
The complexities of long-range missiles are such that lags in mis- 
sile technology will hinder the development of effective nuclear 
weapons systems in many countries. Shorter-range missiles, how- 
ever, are less complex and are more likely to enter into interna- 
tional commerce. But even the longer-range missiles are becoming 
less complex and less expensive, and it may well be that missile 
technology will spread about as rapidly as nuclear technology. 
It seems likely that this will be true for China, the most threatening 
of the pre-industrial powers. In addition, there are other delivery 
systems which could be used; the submarine, for example, or more 
pedestrian methods-the sabotaging ship or the planted" valise- 
or more ingenious methods which cost little or nothing. 
The spread of nuclear military capabilities will almost certainly 
decrease the stability of deterrent systems. The greater the num- 
ber of nations that possess the capability of launching a nuclear 
strike, the greater the probability that there will be a strike. 
The spread of nuclear military technology will greatly increase 
the complexity of deterrent systems. Thus, when China becomes 
a nuclear and missile power, or when we believe that she has be- 
come one, we must train our missiles upon the bases and cities of 
that country as well as upon those of the Soviet Union. And the 
Soviet Union will undoubtedly feel it necessary to deter China 
as well. In any event, as nation after nation arms-China, Japan, 
East Germany, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Spain, Argentina-we 
must make decisions as to whether or not we must establish sys- 
tems to deter them. Are they potential enemies or friends? To what 
extent can they be trusted? 
Accidental and Catalytic War 
Even with only two nuclear powers and four nuclear nations in 
the world, there is a finite chance that an all-out nuclear war 
could be triggered accidentally. This could be brought about as 
the result of either mechanical or human failure. No machine is 
perfect. No human being is free from the possibility of making 
errors of judgment. Already, for example, there have been several 
accidents involving American aircraft carrying nuclear bombs. 
I 
One can conceive of a number of ways in which a nuclear' war 
might start accidentally. Radar evidence might be misinterpreted, 
and under the misconception that an -attack had been launched 
by one .country a retaliatory attack might be launched by the 
other. ~e&mnaissance flights carried out by one nation over or 
near the territory of another might be construed as a m  of war 
and might lead to the launching of a &st strike against air or 
missile bases. An American pilot might, as a result of strain during 
a period of tension, bomb a Soviet city. The reverse situation is 
also conceivable - and were New York suddenly demolished, 
there is little question that with our present organization and 
philosophy we would retaliate quickly and vigorously. When we 
are fully in the age of missiles we must reckon particularly with 
the possibility of serious accident, largely bedause the time for 
decision will be so short. 
We are not far distant from the time when we will use satellites 
on a large scale for reconnaissance purposes, for communications, 
and as carriers of weapons. The use of such satellites might be 
interpreted as acts of war, as might efforts on the part of a 
potential enemy to destroy them. Such satellites could be used to 
jam radio communications over another nation's territory, and 
this in itself might appear to justdy the launching of an attack. 
Intensive submarine activity can lead to accident. Misinter- 
pretation of the identity or intentions of an unknown underwater 
vehicle could lead to unwarranted action on our part. Failure of 
submarine communications with- home base could result in the 
premature firing of her missiles. 
We must worry also about "administrative accidents''-that is, 
about military decisions to launch attacks that are not adequately 
approved by higher authorities. Not long ago a Tunisian village 
was bombed by the French military without the prior consent or 
knowledge of the French government. It is conceivable that 
military officials in the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. might bring about a 
coup and order an attack of their own without adequate approval. 
Recently the House of Commons heard a difficult question ad- 
dressed to the Prime Minister: What guarantees could be brought 
forward that would assure that no more "overflights" out of 
British bases would be made? The ensuing discussion revolved on 
the possibility of this sort of action being undertaken by the 
American military without the knowledge of either the British 
or the American governments. 
Clearly no such assurance can be given. The possibilities of 
military action ( not necessarily of the button-pushing kinds ) 
being undertaken en camera by a small group of officers, either 
American or Russian, grows as the number of ways in which 
politicians7 ultimatums can be violated increases. As crisis com- 
pounds crisis, from Cuba to the Congo, the probability of mis- 
judgment, accident, or precipitous military action is vastly 
increased. 
Nor can this situation, unstable as it is, become anything but 
worse so long as violence provides the means for enforcement 
of the traditional diplomatic chalkJine: "This far and no farther!" 
The answer to the English is obvious: "We hope to exercise 
nominal field control over American and NATO military units, 
both our tactical forces and such activities as aerial espionage, 
but we have no means at hand or in sight to guarantee such con- 
trol. The only temporary encouragement we can offer is that 
there seems to be a deterrent balance which renders the execution 
of the threats against you improbable. But we do not know at 
what point the U.S.S.R. will decide that the military margin is 
sufficiently in her favor to warrant the risks involved in carrying 
out these threats." 
What we cannot bring ourselves to say openly in this hypo- 
thetical reply is: As the Russian military position becomes more 
clearly dominant in the next decade, and as increasing psycho- 
logical pressure is brought to bear on the Western positions 
everywhere, the likelihood of desperate, erratic, unauthorized 
action by U.S. and Allied forces is much greater than the chance 
of similar breaches of discipline by the Soviets. For one thing, 
the Soviet political and military policies are one policy, responsive 
only to the master plan of action-whatever it may be. For an- 
other, the Soviets have a polished method at hand for "violation 
by proxy," the calculated use of dominated or threatened powers 
to perform acts of belligerence which the U.S.S.R. may disclaim. 
The U.S.-NATO alliance, on the other hand, is hampered opera- 
tionally by political differences, exposure inequities, geographic 
awkwardness which complicates logistic and communication prob- 
lems, and, to some extent, language difficulties. 
Thus, if things continue the way they are going, the possibility 
of a coup by the United States military is real. The general as- 
sumption that the American soldier is automatically responsive 
to his civilim'masters might be rudely shaken were there a serious 
and clearly visible retreat on the world front by the American 
policy-makers. The same might be true in the event of a disarma- 
ment agreement which the military does not consider fool-proof. 
In addition to accident, it is possible that the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. can become involved in a war which neither nation 
wants as the result of the catalytic action of a third nation. For 
example, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco 
might suddenly be destroyed by thermonuclear weapons launched 
from submarines. The submarines themselves might not be identi- 
fiable, but we might with good reason suspect them to be from 
the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances we might launch a 
devastating attack upon that country, not realizing that a third 
country (China? Japan? Argentina?), rather than the Soviet 
Union, had attacked us. 
Limited War 
Given a stable deterrent system, it is widely believed in the United 
States that we can engage in small or rimited" wars without 
serious danger that large-scale nuclear weapons systems will be 
brought into use. It is even visualized that such wars can be 
fought utilizing "tactical" nuclear weapons ranging in size from 
a few hundred tons to perhaps 100,000 tons of TNT equivalent. 
About a decade ago the United States announced that it was 
embarking upon a program of developing nuclear weapons for 
tactical use by ground forces. By making use of the enormous 
energy available in nuclear weapons, it was hoped to neutralize 
to some extent Soviet superiority in armed manpower. 
Following development of nuclear weapons for use by ground 
troops, the Soviet Union developed similar weapons. Our relative 
gains, thus far, do not appear to be very great. Indeed, with 
tactical nuclear weapons in the possession of both sides, savings 
in manpower turn out to be non-existent. The major change in 
the nature of ground warfare resulting from tactical nuclear 
weapons appears to be that it will almost certainly be more 
destructive of property than ground warfare of either World 
War I1 or Korean vintage. 
Thus far, nuclear weapons have not been used by troops in war. 
However, there is every reason to expect that they will be used 
in a war in which ground forces are used, for we have built up 
our own forces around such weapons. As our forces are at present 
organized, it would be difficult for us to fight a limited ground 
war of any appreciable size without using nuclear weapons. 
Were the United States to become involved in a limited war, 
in Western Europe for example, in which nuclear weapons were 
used, but in which it was the express wish of the participants to 
avoid using their all-out retaliatory forces, there would never- 
theless be serious danger that the relatively small war would 
"escalate" into a large one. Ten-kiloton weapons, although con- 
siderably less destructive than those of the megaton variety, can 
nevertheless be used to destroy towns and cities on a massive 
scale. As the scale of the destruction increases, one side may deem 
it desirable to carry the war to the enemies' retaliatory forces and 
cities. Or the retaliatory forces could be brought into operation 
as the result of one side's stepping over an arbitrary line of de- 
marcation specified by the enemy-a city, a national boundary, 
the energy of an explosion. 
In any event, it is difficult to visualize techniques of truly 
stabilizing limited wars in which nuclear weapons are used. Any 
limitation on size of explosive would be quite arbitrary and diffi- 
cult to monitor. Although it is conceivable that a small nuclear war 
could be kept from escalating, the probability would be high that 
sooner or later it would turn into an all-out war. 
If tactical nuclear weapons were to be' outlawed in war, the 
situation would appear to be less unstable. Nevertheless, even in 
a war fought with conventional weapons, there would be serious 
danger that it too would grow to the point where the retaliatory 
systems would be triggered. Further, although it is conceivable 
that nuclear weapons might be outlawed from use in the field, it 
would nevertheless be necessary for armies to prepare to fight 
with them-in other words, to prepare to fight two quite different 
types of war. Even were such weapons outlawed, the knowledge 
for manufacturing and using them would remain. There would, 
as a result, be serious danger that one side might attempt to put 
them into use, taking advantage of the unprepared state of the 
other side. 
In this connection, we should recognize the likelihood that any 
future war that is of appreciable size will involve the use of 
nuclear weapons at some stage, no matter what disarmament 
controls have been in existence prior to the outbreak of the war. 
Even were the nations of the world to cany out successfully a 
program of total nuclear disarmament, including the elimination 
of long-range missiles, the knowledge needed to manufacture such 
weapons would remain. Once a "conventional" war broke out, 
there would almost certainly be a frantic race upon the part of the 
participants to manufacture the weapons once again. Each of 
the antagonists would realize that the first nation to produce 
megaton nuclear weapons in quantity, together with the means of 
delivering them, would have the opposing side at its mercy. 
Factors Preventing Agreement 
on Arms Control and Disarmament 
On the basis of the considerations thus far discussed, it is amply 
clear that the world is in great danger for as long as the arms race 
continues and the giant retaliatory systems remain in place, ready 
for use. It would appear to be obvious that major steps must be 
taken aimed at eliminating the retaliatory systems and bringing 
the arms race under control. In other words, the situation warrants 
agreements between the nuclear powers aimed at instituting a 
considerable measure of disarmament with inspections and con- 
trols, slowing the rate of spread of nuclear military technology, 
and breaking the vicious research and development circle that 
helps perpetuate the arms race. In spite of the overwhelming need 
for such agreements, however, there does not appear to be much 
chance that adequate steps will be taken in the near future. 
There are few people in America today who care to be identified 
with a belligerent militaristic policy which is likely to lead to war. 
It is generally recognized that the time is past when talk of 
"preventive" war could be rationalized. Yet the war machine 
gathers strength, and serious consideration of its diminution or 
dismantling is rare and often timid. Aside from the difficulties 
involved in the Realpolitik of the international situation, there are 
domestic forces, largely unspoken, that commit us more absolutely 
each day to the path away from effective arms control-not to speak 
of actual disarmament. 
There are many knowledgeable persons who believe that under 
no circumstances should research and development on new 
weapons systems be stopped. There would always be the fear that 
the potential enemy might develop a greatly superior system of 
offense or defense which would give him a considerable advan- 
tage. The only way of minimizing the danger of such a threat is to 
maintain a diversity of research and development covering all 
major aspects of military technology. Since individual nations 
cannot jus* stopping development programs on weapons sys- 
tems, it is clear that the tug-of-war in this area is likely to continue 
-that new offensive systems will continue to replace old ones 
and that these in turn will necessitate new defensive systems. As 
the research and development continue, there will be new break- 
throughs which will make possible still newer systems and render 
older ones obsolete. 
Persons who insist upon perpetuating the military research and 
development race have an impressive argument when they point 
i to the development of the thermonuclear bomb. Following World , 
1 War 11, strong forces in our government, particularly in the J 
scientific community, discouraged the establishment of a research 
and development program aimed at producing megaton weapons. a! 
Many factors were involved in this attitude-some of them prac- 
tical, others emotional and moral. There were others, however, who 
believed just as strongly that our lack of effort in this direction 
could be suicidal. What if the Russians were to develop such 
weapons first? Would they hesitate to make use of their new-found 
strategic advantage? 
The pro-hydrogen bomb forces eventually won out, and a 
vigorous program was established, which was successful in a 
spectacularly short time. The Russians, of course, established their 
own program, which was also successful. 
Today the proponents of maintaining extremely strong programs 
in the development of weapons systems can point to much more ! 
than the hydrogen bomb as justification for their views. The 
rapidly increasing deterrent gap has resulted in large measure 
from our not financing missile development adequately. The Polaris 
development, had it come earlier, would have done much to relieve ., 
the situation. 
Thus, no matter what is possible it must be pursued. Can gigaton 
bombs be built? We must do the work and see. Can climate over 
the Soviet Union be altered? We must experiment. Can the 
earth be burned, broken, kept from rotating? Can the albedo be 
increased? Can all life be eliminated? Can we make the oceans 
boil? All of these questions must be considered. If we don't consider 
them, the Russians might, and if successful they would have us 
at a disadvantage. 
Most persons who view the arms race with alarm and feel that 
something can be done about it believe that nuclear test suspension ,, 
with inspection and controls represents a reasonable first step C' 
which can lead to a more widely-based system of arms control 
and disarmament. It would stop nuclear weapons development at i 
the present stage; it would establish a precedent for other arms 
control arrangements; it would slow the spread of nuclear military 
technology to other areas of the world. 
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Opponents of nuclear test suspension do so in part on the 
grounds that research and development in this area would effec- 
tively be halted (it is difficult to design new products and systems 
without testing them). There are many new areas which the 
research and development-minded persons would like to explore: 
new tactical weapons, anti-missile defense, communications jam- 
ming the effects of tremendous explosions outside the earth's 
atmosphere, improved efticiency of megaton weapons so that the 
very largest could be carried by ICBM's. 
When it is pointed out that Russian resekch in these areas 
would be curtailed also, it is usually suggested that the Russians 
might carry out a clandestine testing program. It is also suggested 
the Russians might already be ahead of us in some of these areas. 
Opponents of nuclear test suspension correctly point out that no 
system of inspection and controls can be 100 per cent effective. 
No matter how elaborate the system might be, there would always 
be a chance (although perhaps very small) that a particular 
clandestine explosion might go undetected. This argument is used 
effectively with many persons who take the view that if there is 
m y  possibility of cheating we should not enter into an agreement. 
This same argument can be used effectively against test bans in 
any military area. For example, although missile tests could be 
monitored very effectively, it would always be possible in principle 
for a test to be undertaken secretly. Technical systems of monitor- 
ing and inspecting, like massive retaliatory systems, are fallible. 
In our modem technological world there can be no such thing as 
100 per cent security-like infinity, it can be approached but never 
reached. 
Although the probability of detecting clandestine tests can never 
be increased to 100 per cent, it can be increased substantially given 
adequate research and development in this area. Thus far, how- 
ever, the responsibility for research and development in the nuclear 
test detection area has been placed in the hands of those groups 
that are most opposed to test cessation: the Air Force and the 
Atomic Energy Commission. 
The foregoing illustrates the effectiveness of the alliance, which 
is still young, between the scientist-technician on the one hand and 
the military on the other. Tens of thousands of scientists and tech- 
nicians have devoted aU of their professional lives to the invention 
and construction of weapons. A majority of those who went to 
work after Wmld War I1 are convinced that weaponry is a way of 
life for themselves and expect the U.S.-Soviet contest to continue 
forever. Many of them are-artidate and highly valued consultants 
in every walls of American life, from the Congressional committee 
to the P.T.A. 
Although-these men are not generally openly political, they are 
in every sense the paramilitary-civilian soldiers. They have spent 
most of their adult lives in the direct or secondary employment of 
one or another of the services, and their sympathy for &d con- 
currence with their uniformed colleagues are often marked and 
open. Should a showdown between the military and the civilian 
sectors occur, this group could be relied upon to staunchly back 
the handlers of the weapons they have so devotedly evolved. 
. The military leaders themselves are quite naturally not enthusi- 
astic for disarmament or for any steps that might curtail the free- 
dom of action of the armed services. These is rather clearly a 
military elite emerging in the United Stat& which is dedicated to 
a position of perpetual hostility toward the Soviet Union and which 
wields enormous political as &ell as military power. 
A small but not negligible fraction of the $40 billion defense 
budget is invested judiciously each year in a wellconceived pro- 
gram of public and Congressional -relations. As a result, the 
military lobby is now the strongest lobby in Washington. Were 
the State Department to negotiate successfully an arms control 
agreement with the Soviet Union and were the armed services 
united in their opposition to the agreement, the agreement would 
almost certainly be defeated by the Senate. There is little doubt 
that the armed services exert more control over Congress than 
that body exerts over the Defense Department. Indeed, the 
military elite is clearly in a position to assume actual political 
command over the U.S. striking forces if there are serious signs 
of u~eakness" in U.S. foreign relations. 
Among the deadly myths that tend to support the argument 
for retention and expansion of the arms race, the least examined, 
but nonetheless powerful and inhibiting, are those revolving on 
our dependence on the war economy. The primary apprehension 
about the reduction of the weapons budget is based on a single, 
simple statistic-the $40-50 billion defens&%udget is a 10-12 per 
cent segment of the gross national product. But, as Gerard Pie1 
points out: one must adjust to the "investment multiplier" to 
determine the real derivative economic activity generated and 
sustained by the weapons business. This arithmeticaL device 
suggests that between one-quarter and one-third of the economic 
activity of the nation as a whole is based upon the weapons race. 
The primary war equipage business supports a host of dependent 
enterprises which are nominally "civilian" in nature. 
The first statistic, the 10-12 per cent, is the more widely used 
because it is the easier to amornodate. The argument for the 
relative unimportance of the war economy goes this way: The 
GNP is slated to accelerate at about 5 per cent per year. If we can 
hold war expenditures to their present doRw level, then obviously 
the proportion of the national income spent on "defense" would de- 
crease each year. There are two assumptions here, and both of 
them are slippery. First, there is no assurance that the kind of 
economic faltering encountered in 1958, the year of the still largely 
unexplained "recession," cannot and will not be repeated with 
greater or lesser intensity and for unforeseeable periods. Second, 
the dollar demands of the arms race are flatly unpredictable from 
month to month. 
If the expenditure on weapons systems increases during the 
next five years at the same rate as it has during the last five, even 
allowing the 5 per cent annual GNP increase, the use of the 
Keynesian multiplier would indicate that close to 50 per cent of the 
total of U.S. production and business in 1965 may be directly or' 
indirectly war goods aqd s e ~ c e s .  
At what point will this kind of economic dependence become 
so crucial that it cannot be substantially reduced without grave 
harm to the basic economic structure? It may well be that the 
time has already come. 
SGerard Piel, ' m e  Economics of Disarmament," B W n  of the Atomic 
Scientlrts (April, 1980). 
The elements and conditiom reinforcing the war economy are 
many. Real, justified fear of the mysterious Soviet juggernaut is 
held by most of the people in one way or another. Substantial dis- 
armament now, or at any foreseeable time ahead, seems emotion- 
ally (and, therefore, practically) impossible. On the contrary, 
the psychology of fear promises to increase to the point where 
substantial personal economic sacrifices cuuld be asked of the 
people-and given willingly, if the alternative parades as military 
vulnerability. Even a full-scale depression would undoubtedly be 
largely b l d d  on Soviet actions and pressures. It is conceivable 
that the public reaction would be similar to that displayed after 
Pearl Harbor. The butter is more likely to disappear than the guns. 
THE NEXT PHASE OF THE ARMS RACE: 
Defense and Recovery 
in a Thermonuclear War 
We have seen that our prospects of securing agreements upon 
disarmament and arms control are poor when viewed domestically. 
When viewed internationally (How far will Russia be willing to 
go? What is her conception of our intentions? What about China?) 
the prospects appear to be even more remote. 
We have also seen that if the arms race continues at its present 
pace, the probability of war is very high. What, then, are our 
prospects? If war indeed approaches the inevitable, we should 
inquire into means for minimizing its impact upon us. Can we 
defend ourselves? Can we recover? 
In connection with our military position, it is clear that an offense 
has enormous advantage over even the most active defense. Un- 
doubtedly in the years ahead there will be considerable progress 
in the development of anti-missile missiles. But it is doubtful that 
we will ever be able to destroy more than a small fraction of the 
missiles headed toward our military installations and cities. 
An obvious defense measure, which in principle could be made 
&edive as desired, would be to protect the people and their 
cities from the effects of nuclear weapons. Relatively simple 
shelters, it is alleged, can protect people outside the areas of blast 
from the effects of fallout. Very deep and elaborate underground 
shelters can protect people from the primary and secondary 
thermal effects. Relatively primitive underground storage shelters 
can protect stocks of food, equipment, and raw materials. 
We saw in an earlier section that a 1,500-megaton attack upon 
the United States today would result in about 60 million casualties. 
The installation of fallout shelters in the afeas outside the major 
cities would decrease the number of immediate casualties con- 
siderably. Installation of shelters to protect against blast and 
thermal effects might decrease the casualties to about 5 million. 
Were all business activities (except farming) and all residences 
moved very deeply underground, casualties could be reduced 
dramatically. 
It is =cult to estimate the extent of the damage and the number 
of casualties which we could support in the United States and still 
recover from the effects of the blow. A great deal would depend 
upon the extent of the preparations which had been made. A great 
deal would depend upon the true vulnerability of modem indus- 
trial society to disruption. 
The Soviet Union lost about 20 million persons (about 10 per 
cent of her population) during World War I1 and recovered 
rapidly-but the losses were sustained over a period of several 
years. Kahn6 has estimated that with rather modest preparations 
we could sustain a sudden loss of at least 20 million persons and 
rebuild our economy in about ten years. This estimate makes some 
assumptions concerning the vulnerability of the industrialeco- 
nomic organism which may not be true. It assumes, for example, 
that the major metropolitan areas and the areas of lower popula- 
tion density are relatively independent of each other and that the 
economy could be rebuilt by the latter were the former totally 
destroyed. It assumes that people will behave rationally following 
the attack. It ignores the effect of shock. It minimizes the sensi- 
6 Herman Kahn, op. cit. 
Wty to disruption of the complex network of mines, farms, 
factories, distribution centers, tramportation facilities, and com- 
mwlrication systems. 
The question of whether or not a nation can recover from a 
nuclear attack of a given magnitude cannot be answered easily, 
for it involves a multiphcity of interlocking factors, some physical 
and others human. One can debate the question endlessly, and 
in the long run one would not know for certain until the great 
test was made. 
In the light of our best estimates of current Soviet offensive 
capabilities, were an all-out attack to be made upon us today, 
recovery might be possible. Again, this question is debatable. 
Were the attack to take place in another five years, and were we 
to make no preparations, recovery would be extremely dubious. 
Presiunably preparation could expedite recovery from such an 
attack. For this reason we can expect great emphasis to be placed 
during the next few years on programs aimed at decreasing the 
vulnerability of our population and expediting post-attack recov- 
ery. The next phase of the "arms race" will almost certainly involve 
great emphasis upon the area of civilian defense. 
If the arms race continues, as it probably will, its future pattern 
seems clear in broad outline. As a result of the emergence of the 
current tremendous capabilities for killing and destroying, pro- 
grams will be started aimed at the evacuation of cities, the con- 
struction of fallout shelters in regions outside the major metro- 
politan areas, and the construction of limited underground shelters. 
Increased offensive capabilities will then emerge which will to 
some extent neutralize these efforts. Larger bombs will be com- 
pressed into sufficiently small packages to be carried by ICBM's. 
Very large bombs (about 1,000 megatons) will be built which, 
when exploded at an altitude of about 300 miles, could sear six 
Western states. 
The new developments will cause people to burrow more deeply 
into the ground. Factories will be built in caves, as will apartment 
houses and stores. Eventually most human life will be under- 
ground, confronted by arsenals capable of destroying all life over 
the land areas of the earth. Deep under the ground people will be 
safe-at least until such time as we learn how to make 
5. - explosives capable of pulverizing the earth to great depths. 
E The arms race and the associated uprooting of established in- 
:.- stitutions will outstrip by far the spiral of upheaval described 
< .-- by Wang Chi during the war which preceded the 'Pang dynasty: 
"These days, continually fuddled with drink 
I fail to satisfy the appetites of  the sod. 
But seeing men a11 behaving like drunkads, 
How can I alone remain sober?" 
The Soviet Union has apparently, in the last few years, instituted 
a civilian defense program of substantial magnitude. It is probable 
that within the next two or three years the United States will 
embark on a crash shelter program for a large proportion of its 
citizens and some of its industry. Once the shelter program is 
underway, it will constitute a s i e c a n t  retreat from the idea of 
the obsolescence of war. 
Once the e p l e  are convinced that they can survive the present 
1 state of the art of killing, a broad and significant new habit pattern 
will have been introduced and accepted, one grotesquely different 
from any we have known for thousands of years-that of adjusting 
ourselves to the idea of living in holes. From that time onward 
it will be simple to adjust ourselves to living in deeper holes. 
Tens of thousands of years ago our Mowterian and Aurignacian 
ancestors lived in caves. The vast knowledge which we have 
accumulated during the intervening millenia will have brought us 
full cycle. The epic of man's journey upward into the light will 
have ended. 
Is War Obsolete? 
Men have engaged in acts of war for unknown millenia. It is now 
often stated that the new techniques of war have rendered the 
war systSm obsolete-that war and the threat of war is no longer a 
useful extension of diplomacy. That this will eventually be true is 
questiuqable. If the pnrrs race eantInues and if man survives 
that raw, it will eventually end as a gobsqye stalemate involving 
weepons of such emmous destructiveness that they simply cannot 
.be d - n o r  can their use be &ectively threatened. 
It is  also possible that war wiU becume obsolete prior to the 
dimate stalemate, because man might take it upon himself to 
In the meantime, however, war might not be obsolete, because 
people might k b t w  that wars can be fought without fantastic 
danger. In adher wm&, people might believe the coasquenaes 
of war to be less terrible than the consquenw of not being both 
able and uilling to fight a war. 
Whether or not a war is gotentidy too dangerous to fight will 
depend of mme upon individual outlook. How many death can 
be trohtd? Who will do the "tolerating'? The political leaders? 
The people thanse1vres? What are the chances for recovery3 Will 
anyone want to survive and "recover"? What are the h c e s  of 
reouvery? In any event, it seems likely that continued ase of the 
war cystem will involve the violent deaths of tens of milliom to 
hundreds of ~~ of persons, coup11ed with the serious risk 
that economic recovery might not be.possible. For as long as 
people and their govements are willing to take such risks-for 
PS long as people and their governments continue to deposit con- 
-fid- in violence as the Uwmn ratio of human disagreements- 
the war system d be the indispensable vehicle of resolution. 
It is - dear tbat ending the war system. demands the common 
amsent of uZZ of the world's powers-those now capable of nuclear 
military adventures and those who one day may be. If any one 
.nation which possesses nuclear potentid belie& that the war 
system is not obsolete, it will be retained. The arms race, h d y  
almost incomprehensible in its capacity for mass annihilation, will 
be elaborated with new elements-chemical, biological, psycho- 
logical-until the arsenals are packed with devices to destroy all 
+> 
the peoples of the world many times over. Yet in tbe long run the 
b4 @sly U ~ o e m  can produce no winner. In any future war the con- 
' * s *  - solation prizes can only be surrender, stalemate, or &a&. 
+ 1- 
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